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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the development and use of scenarios as an approach to guide action in multi-level,
multi-actor adaptation contexts such as food security under climate change. Three challenges are
highlighted: (1) ensuring the appropriate scope for action; (2) moving beyond intervention-based
decision guidance; and (3) developing long-term shared capacity for strategic planning. To overcome
these challenges we have applied explorative scenarios and normative back-casting with stakeholders
from different sectors at the regional level in East Africa. We then applied lessons about appropriate
scope, enabling adaptation pathways, and developing strategic planning capacity to scenarios processes
in multiple global regions. Scenarios were created to have a broad enough scope to be relevant to diverse
actors, and then adapted by different actor groups to ensure their salience in speciﬁc decision contexts.
The initial strategy for using the scenarios by bringing a range of actors together to explore new
collaborative proposals had limitations as well as strengths versus the application of scenarios for
speciﬁc actor groups and existing decision pathways. Scenarios development and use transitioned from
an intervention-based process to an embedded process characterized by continuous engagement.
Feasibility and long-term sustainability could be ensured by having decision makers own the process
and focusing on developing strategic planning capacity within their home organizations.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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3.0/).1. Introduction
Climate change is a signiﬁcant driver of change for food security
in the developing world, because it threatens food production and
its stability as well as other aspects of food systems such as storage,
food access and utilization (Wheeler and Von Braun, 2013). The
impacts of climate change interact with other change dynamics
across economic, political, temporal and biophysical dimensions
and from local to global levels (Ericksen et al., 2009). These changes
are marked by uncertainties that confound attempts to develop
linear and unilateral policies (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993;
Kriegler et al., 2012; van der Sluijs, 2005).e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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different sectors and at multiple levels, with often widely
divergent interests (Ingram et al., 2010). The challenges around
ensuring sustainable food security are systemic, and therefore
require system-wide actions from decision-makers (Ericksen et al.,
2009; Vermeulen et al., 2013). For instance, national policies,
global food prices, or competition between land use types may
restrict or enable adaptation for local actors such as small-scale
farmers or poor urban communities (Mandemaker et al., 2011).
Similarly, a lack of local-level mechanisms and resources for
adaptation and innovation can make large-scale policies or
investments ineffective (Bourgeois et al., 2012).
There is an increasing recognition of the urgent need for science
focusing on food security in the developing world to overcome its
relative inability to play a role in decision-making that leads to
positive impact (Vermeulen et al., 2013). This need is now broadly
recognized by stakeholders providing support for development
and adaptation research. They are urging researchers to critically
re-examine how their work seeks to engage decision-making and
practice. In the context of adaptation planning, social-ecological
systems science has the potential to help decision makers consider
a wide range of interacting stressors and to help them explore
adaptation pathways (Folke et al., 2010). However, a number of
challenges exist for such research to make a difference. First,
attending to what is the relevant scope for collaborative action for
actors with diverse perspectives is important. There is a need to
engage stakeholders at different levels and from different sectors
with diverse and often contesting types of expertise, experience,
values and interests, between whom power differences exist and
who have incentives to behave strategically (Flood and Jackson,
1991; Jasanoff, 2004; Kristjanson et al., 2009). The perceived
credibility, legitimacy, salience and timeliness of science changes
depend on the actor groups involved (Cash et al., 2003; Ostrom,
2010). Secondly, rather than focusing on single interventions and
single adaptation actions, researchers should engage decision-
makers in a demand-driven fashion to help co-manage change
along continuously adaptive pathways, attending to diverse and
shifting contextual challenges (Kristjanson et al., 2009; Reid et al.,
2009; Stafford Smith et al., 2011). Finally, there is a need to develop
long-term capacity for collaborative decision making. Attempts to
guide actors and decision-making from different sectors and across
different system levels can run into serious feasibility challenges
when the aim is to develop shared strategic capacity in the longer
term (Gibbons, 1999; Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008).
This paper presents an effort to tackle these challenges through
the development and use of explorative multi-stakeholder
scenarios (Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008) around agriculture and
food systems at the sub-continental level in multiple global regions
initiated by the CGIAR, a global agricultural development
partnership (Vermeulen et al., 2012, 2013).
The objective of this paper is a critical appraisal, based on
iterative learning, of the potential of multi-stakeholder scenarios
for decision-making to overcome the above challenges in
agriculture and food security in the face of climate change
interacting with other stressors at multiple levels. We will ﬁrst
provide a theoretical background on scenarios development and
use, with a speciﬁc focus on the role of scenarios in a multi-
stakeholder, multi-level, multi-dimensional context (Section 2).
Initial results from the development and use of scenarios for East
Africa will be presented (3), followed by the lessons learned
through that process and how these lessons have been applied in
multiple global regions (4). Finally, we will discuss these learning
steps and their outputs, and what they show about the ability and
challenges of scenarios development and use to tackle the
challenges of scope and collaboration, engaging in adaptation
pathways and developing long-term strategic capacity (5).2. Concepts: the development and use of scenarios in multi-
level, multi-stakeholder contexts
Explorative scenarios are deﬁned here as ‘‘multiple plausible
futures described in words, numbers and/or images’’ (van Notten
et al., 2003). Scenarios methodology is based in systems science
and seeks to recognize and explore uncertainty and complexity in
the decision-makers’ context rather than limiting or simplifying
that context with the pretence of providing a single forecast when
such prediction is not possible (Kok et al., 2006; van der Sluijs,
2005). More linear sense- and decision-making processes that do
not incorporate multiple scenarios still have underlying assump-
tions about the future, effectively operating from a single scenario
that is not examined. This failure of traditional planning to engage
with uncertainty has proven to be problematic in complex systems
(van der Sluijs, 2005; Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008).
In multi-stakeholder contexts, exploratory scenarios can
engage multiple legitimate perspectives involved in framing and
addressing messy challenges such as food security and sustain-
ability (Reilly and Willenbockel, 2010). Bourgeois et al. (2012) give
an extensive overview of scenarios used in the context of
agriculture and food security. Scenarios generated by groups of
stakeholders will naturally be biased towards the perspectives of
those groups (Schoemaker, 1993). In addition, there may be
aspects of future developments that the groups have difﬁculty
exploring or producing, such as biophysical processes (e.g. climate
change) or detailed land use change dynamics responding to
international markets. Quantitative simulation modelling can
provide a complementary perspective against which stakeholders
can test their ideas about plausible futures. Simulation modelling
has several beneﬁts for this purpose. It can outline the scenarios in
numbers that can be used for more concrete analysis of the
consequences of the scenarios, as well as the impacts of policies,
investments and strategies tested against the scenarios. Simulation
modelling can test the coherence of stakeholder assumptions and
help point out contradictory elements in the scenarios. Through
the application of a consistent set of assumptions, simulation
models can generate counter-intuitive effects of the scenarios not
originally imagined by the participants. However, simulation
models are characterized by their own assumptions about systems.
Whereas exploratory scenarios, developed as narratives and other
formats, are able to incorporate a wide range of different factors
and interactions, the scope of simulation models is pre-deﬁned.
Moreover, the models are developed in reference to the past and
present and may not be able to adequately represent transforma-
tive scenarios (Reilly and Willenbockel, 2010). Therefore, stake-
holder-generated scenarios can and should also challenge the
assumptions of models.
Explorative scenarios are suited for the exploration of multi-
dimensional and multi-level aspects of decision contexts (Herrero
et al., 2014; Wilkinson, 2009). Zurek and Henrichs (2007) outline
different ways in which scenarios processes as well as scenarios
themselves can be integrated across geographical levels.
A number of researcher-generated explorative scenario sets,
notably the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic, 2000) and the Millenni-
um Ecosystems Assessment (2005) scenarios, have been adapted
across multiple geographic levels and yet their use in decision-
making has been limited (Wells et al., 2006). The combination of
exploratory scenarios with normative back-casting can link
contexts to decision pathways (Kok et al., 2011; Robinson et al.,
2011). Normative back-casting is distinct from explorative back-
casting used to develop explorative scenarios. Both types of back-
casting work from an end point back to the present. However,
normative back-casting starts with a desired goal and then works
out what needs to happen before that goal is achieved, until
the present is reached. Normative back-casting has been used by
Fig. 1. Using scenarios to develop adaptation pathways through ‘‘back-casting’’ from a shared vision, encountering different future challenges and opportunities in each
scenario.
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explorative scenarios. By combining explorative scenarios and
normative back-casting, decision-makers create what could be
described as normative decision scenarios within contexts
outlined by explorative scenarios, thereby exploring decision
pathways in the context of multiple plausible futures that each
offer different challenges and opportunities (Fig. 1). This way,
robust or ﬂexible decision pathways can emerge that take a
number of contingencies into account. The combination of
plausible explorative scenarios about decision contexts and the
normative back-casting of decision pathways can also be adapted
to examine the feasibility of existing policies, investment plans or
strategies. An alternative to the attempt to separate explorative
and normative elements in scenarios development and use is the
generation of normative scenarios, which does not offer clear
contexts for adaptation planning but can capture diverse
discourses and worldviews (Moss et al., 2010; Reilly and
Willenbockel, 2010).
Though explorative scenarios have shown utility in the context
of decision-making in complex socio-ecological systems (Bour-
geois et al., 2012; Kok et al., 2011), challenges remain. The
development and use of scenarios is associated with difﬁculties
that relate to our three challenges. First, exactly because
explorative scenarios processes seek to address broad factors of
change and take a holistic systems view of decision contexts, they
may be perceived as being far removed from actions to be taken
unless and until they are used directly in planning (Bourgeois et al.,
2012; Kriegler et al., 2012; Reilly and Willenbockel, 2010; Wells
et al., 2006). Secondly, scenario development often happens in
intervention-style processes that may not be tailored to diverse
stakeholder demands, or compatible with the need to develop
longer-term adaptation pathways that deal with evolving multi-
dimensional challenges because they focus too much on single
actions (Berkes and Folke, 2002; Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008).
Finally, multi-stakeholder scenarios processes can be costly and
time-consuming, while familiarity with such methods may be low
among decision-makers. Co-ownership of such processes by
decision-makers, and a focus in scenarios processes on developing
the internal capacity of planning bodies to develop and use
scenarios themselves as a sustainable skill, is often missing (Kok
et al., 2011).3. Methods and initial results in East Africa
Processes to develop explorative scenarios and use them to
guide various decision pathways through normative back-casting
have been initiated in multiple focus regions in the Climate
Change, Agriculture and Food Security programme, selected for a
high vulnerability of agricultural systems and food security to
climate change. These regions are East Africa, West Africa, South
Asia, Southeast Asia, Central America and the Andes region. The
development of scenarios was initiated ﬁrst with stakeholders in
East Africa from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda,
Burundi. The initial results from East Africa generated lessons that
were applied to further work in East Africa and in similar processes
in the other regions. The main steps of the process are stakeholder-
driven explorative scenario development, the quantiﬁcation of
such explorative scenarios through multiple models, and the use of
the scenarios through normative back-casting to evaluate decision
pathways with different user groups.
3.1. Scenarios development: initial results
In East Africa, explorative scenarios were developed at the
regional level to examine key uncertainties for agriculture and food
security under climate change. Over two regional-level workshops,
stakeholders from regional research organizations, governments
and civil society focusing on agriculture, food security, environ-
mental change and economic development generated qualitative
scenarios and made assumptions for quantiﬁcation. The overall
topical scope agreed by the stakeholders was ‘‘the future of
agriculture, food security, livelihoods and environments in East
Africa’’ – later speciﬁed further to a number of indicators (see
Table 1 and Appendix A). Stakeholders saw 2030 as the appropriate
horizon for the scenario time lines. The ‘‘deductive’’, two-axes
approach was used to frame the scenarios (Van der Heijden, 2005).
This approach entails that stakeholders identify key factors of
future change, decide which of these factors are most uncertain as
well as most relevant to the scope of the exercise, and produce two
axes that each represent two plausible future states for a factor.
The combination of these axes produces end states for four
development pathways for contextual factors in four distinct
scenarios.
Fig. 2. The key uncertainties that structure the East Africa regional scenarios, with visual
for textual summaries and indicators.
Table 1
Indicators of interest outlined by the participants in the East Africa scenarios
development process. An  indicates which of these indicators are either produced
by the models or used to provide inputs into the models. See Appendix A for
directions of change outlined for these indicators by the participants.
Scope of indicators for scenarios Model inputs Model outputs
Gross domestic product 
Corruption
Political stability
Infrastructure 
Urbanization
Yields for rain-fed crops 
Yields for irrigated crops 
Area for rain-fed arable land 
Area for irrigated arable land 
Livestock numbers 
Livestock yields 
Calorie availability per capita per day 
Regional production of commodities 
Regional demand for commodities 
Import and export of commodities 
Agricultural input costs 
Nutrition
Dietary diversity
Poverty
Equity
Access to health care
Land use change 
Biodiversity
Emissions 
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the question whether East Africa will integrate economically and
politically, or end up maintaining its fragmented status quo.
Another uncertain and relevant factor according to participants
was whether pro-active or reactive governance by state and non-
state actors with regard to the speciﬁc issues of agriculture and
food security, livelihoods of the rural poor and environmental
degradation would dominate in the region. Initially, climate
change was treated the same across all scenarios, given the relative
certainty around this driver up to 2030 perceived by stakeholders
based on Jones and Thornton (2009). Similarly, with a time horizon
up to 2030 the participants assumed that the different scenario
pathways did not have diverging impacts on population, which
was therefore kept constant across the scenarios and followed the
United Nations 2010 projection (United Nations Population
Division, 2010).
The initial features of each scenario were developed into
narratives by breakout groups in the ﬁrst workshop, and
subsequently developed into 10 page narratives by the breakout
groups between the ﬁrst and second workshop. A second
workshop was organized to review and reﬁne the scenario
narratives – a process that the breakout groups again continued
after the workshop.
The four scenarios generated for East Africa are as follows,
illustrated in Fig. 2. ‘Industrious Ants’ is a world where state and
non-state actors are proactive and committed to regionalization.
This scenario has many beneﬁts for food security, environments
and livelihoods, but new challenges emerge around an active summaries of the scenario narratives by cartoonist Mauvine Were. See Appendix A
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for autonomy in the global arena. ‘Herd of Zebra’ is a world where
regional integration has developed, but the focus is mainly on
industrialization and economic growth and little attention is given
to food security, environments and livelihoods until crises occur.
Inequality characterizes the region. ‘Lone Leopards’ is a world
characterized by fragmented but proactive governments and non-
state actors that achieve scattered though sometimes strong and
fast successes; however, there is much mistrust among countries
and organizations, and the region is marked by political and
economic instability. ‘Sleeping Lions’ is a world that sees self-
interested governments and non-state actors turning a blind eye or
proﬁting from regional and international exploitation of land and
resources. This leads to public unrest time and time again, but
never to structural change. Appendix A provides more extensive
summaries of the scenarios.
3.2. Explorative scenarios as suitable contexts for decision-making
When scenarios are designed not to be standalone products, but
to be part of an active use process such as combining explorative
scenarios with normative back-casting, the choice can be made to
separate plausible, explorative ‘‘what may happen?’’ futures from
normative ‘‘what decision-makers want to achieve’’ scenarios as
much as possible (Kok et al., 2011). This way, explorative scenarios
are only about contextual factors that decision-makers have no
direct control over, to allow users space to freely consider their
(normative) objectives and pathways towards those objectives
under a range of different plausible futures (Robinson et al., 2011).
However, the decision space differs depending on the actor: for
instance, a rural village has a decision space that is different from the
East African Community. Moreover, if the contextual, explorative
scenarios are too far removed from a given actor’s decision space, for
instance only describing global-level factors without detailing
regional responses, they may lose salience to that actor. The process
organizers aimed to ensure appropriate decision spaces for users of
the East Africa scenarios. First, in the use of the scenarios, on a case-
by-case basis, decision-makers were given the opportunity to ﬁrst
adapt the scenarios to be plausible and salient from their
perspective. Secondly, the basic scenarios were further developed
with the stakeholder group to explore possible unintended
consequences of scenarios that might at ﬁrst glance be considered
purely desirable from the perspective of many users, and to explore
the opportunities offered by scenarios that might be considered
purely undesirable. For instance, in the Industrious Ants scenario,
East African actors struggle with the formulation of policies aimed
towards developing independent regional food production, while in
Sleeping Lions there is a vitalization of civil society.
3.3. Quantifying scenarios
Two models were chosen to quantify the East Africa explorative
scenarios: the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural
Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) (Nelson et al., 2010) and Global
Biomass Optimization Model (GLOBIOM) (Havlı´k et al., 2011). These
are both global partial equilibrium models, which means that they
are not simulating entire economies but instead focus only on
markets related to agricultural products. Each model has different
features. IMPACT is designed to examine alternative futures for
global food supply, demand, trade and prices, while GLOBIOM is
designed to provide policy advice on global issues concerning land
use competition between major land-based production sectors.
While IMPACT and GLOBIOM are global models, they are being
modiﬁed to enable speciﬁc regional applications to be simulated.
These two models were chosen because together they covered
some signiﬁcant elements of the scenarios in complementary ways(Table 1). Compared to the qualitative scenarios, however, the
scope of the models is relatively narrow. Both models are most
detailed on the production side of food systems and while they
feature demand, intermediate elements of food systems are not
detailed. As partial equilibrium models, they do not address
general economic development (gross domestic product and
population are exogenous). The two models do not simulate
differences between socio-economic groups. They also do not offer
information on agriculture as a source of livelihoods. Environmen-
tal change indicators are restricted to agriculture-driven land use
change. Furthermore, both models are designed to explore long-
term trends and do not currently take short-term variability or
shocks into account (Fuss et al., 2011). These characteristics of the
models have consequences for how their results can and cannot be
used and communicated (Section 3.4). These models were chosen
because they have elements of other models (general equilibrium
models, broader integrated assessment models, pure land use
change models) but provide more detailed information on the
production, demand and trade of agricultural commodities.
However, expansion of the quantiﬁcation of the scenarios into
other model types has been a goal (see Section 4.1).
To provide stakeholder-generated inputs into the models, a
third workshop was organized. This workshop was also an
opportunity to involve a broader diversity of expertise as indicated
by the original participants, including social scientists and
representatives of the media. Because in comparison to the
qualitative scenarios, the two models only produced part of the
indicators of interest to the participants, the process organizers
and participants agreed that a broader set of semi-quantitative
indicators would be outlined, determined by the scope of the
scenarios rather than the models. This way, scenario users are
provided information about directions of change even for
indicators that are not part of the model simulations, and can
serve to inform other model types for further quantiﬁcation.
Table 1 provides the full list of indicators and highlights those
either used as inputs for, or provided as outputs from, the models.
Participants provided what they thought were the directions
and magnitudes of change for each indicator over multiple time
steps, and provided the logic for these changes from the relevant
scenario narrative. Capturing the logic behind each change helps
interpret further analyses using the scenarios as well as the
quantitative model outputs. Semi-quantitative assumptions pro-
vided by the stakeholders were then translated into fully
quantiﬁed driver inputs for gross domestic product, yields,
different production systems, infrastructure and production costs
and land use policy, referencing historic data and using the Food
Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 2050 scenarios analysis
of the International Food Policy Research Institute (Nelson et al.,
2010) to compare assumptions.
A ﬁrst set of outputs was generated by the two models and
presented to a representative group of participants from the
explorative scenarios development process. Any comments on the
plausibility of the model results in the East African context were
taken up and used to adapt the drivers for a new run. Appendix B
provides results and insights from the revised outputs.
3.4. Using scenarios to enable adaptation pathways
The East Africa scenarios were used in normative back-casting
in a regional-level workshop in Arusha, Tanzania with state actors
(20 policy advisors from diverse departments, representatives of
regional governance bodies, the Eastern African Community and
the Lake Victoria Basin Commission) and another regional
workshop in Nairobi with non-state actors (22 civil society, NGOs,
representatives of farmers’ and agricultural entrepreneurs’ asso-
ciations). By starting with separate meetings between government
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process allowed each of these groups to make their strategic
positions clear and to show where each group needed the other.
In each workshop, participants were asked to review the
scenarios on (1) plausibility and (2) relevance to their decision
contexts, and to adapt them to improve the scenarios on these
criteria. This was done by having the original scenario narratives
plotted on a timeline that included dimensions on socio-economic
changes, food security, livelihoods and environments, and then
asking participants to remove, replace or add elements of the
scenarios.
These changes could not be reﬂected in the model results, though
trends from the models were general enough to provide room for
multiple interpretations. The model results were used mostly as
reference in discussions when numeric information was required,
while the adapted scenario narratives were the central focus of the
exercises. The presentation of the model results and the main
insights they generated (Appendix B) was done in a plenary session
that focused on how the models related to the narratives and the
differences between the two models. As an example, Appendix C
shows the policy advisors’ stated responses to the model results. In
the meeting itself, the discussion of the model results largely focused
on clarifying that these results were explorative rather than
forecasts, and illustrative of some key elements of the scenarios
rather than covering their entire scope (Appendix B). Time was spent
highlighting and discussing key limitations of the models such as a
lack of a connection between agricultural production and income
and the lack of short-term variability in the results.
Having adapted the scenarios, participants re-examined previ-
ously collectively and broadly deﬁned normative goals in small
groups with the aim of coming up with concrete 2030 objectives and
plans for themselves and their organizations, i.e. what each could
contribute in order to achieve, together with fellow participants,
these joint objectives. Following this, each of the groups assigned to a
particular scenario was asked to back-cast from these more concrete
objectives to determine what previous steps were needed (in 2025,
2020 and further backward) to achieve them. However, the
development of these reverse pathways did not happen in a
vacuum, but in an adaptive fashion with regard to contextual
challenges and opportunities offered by each adapted scenario. This
way, each scenario challenged the participants’ ideas about how to
get to their speciﬁc goals by asking them to ﬁnd alternative
pathways or to reframe their goals. Industrious Ants offered
opportunities for regional development not currently available,
and therefore challenged participants to think beyond current
‘crisis-mode’ problem solving, as well as how to deal with new
problems related to regional corruption and regional autonomy. A
key factor in this scenario was the assumption that the full beneﬁts
of regionalization would take a long time to be realized, and that
regional institutions also meant slow decision-making processes.
Policy makers who were seeking to effect change in the Herd of Zebra
scenario stood relatively alone, and civil society, non-governmental
organizations and social entrepreneurs had very few government
resources to draw upon except for funds related to larger
development, which meant that the framing of activities would
be important. Lone Leopards allowed policy advisors and non-state
actors to consider solutions at the national level where action could
be taken relatively effectively compared to the regional level. On the
other hand, the relative lack of regional collaboration meant that
there was much to be improved at this level. Finally, Sleeping Lions
provided very few options, with a reactive, fragmented East Africa –
and therefore both policy advisors (isolated in this scenario) and
non-state actors were challenged to consider alternatives and focus
on unorthodox partnerships and bottom-up strategies.
The pathways developed in the context of different adapted
scenarios were evaluated in terms of their feasibility in otherscenarios. In some cases, pathways developed in scenarios with
more favourable conditions than others were not transferable to
those with less favourable conditions. In most cases, though, core
ideas could be implemented across multiple scenarios, but the
pathways to achieve them would have to be different – resulting in
an analysis of a range of feasible pathways towards improved food
security and environmental change depending on the need to
adapt to different future conditions.
Table 2 summarizes vulnerabilities identiﬁed using the
scenarios in both the state and non-state workshops regarding
the governance of East Africa for future agriculture, food security,
livelihoods and environments under climate change, and proposals
developed to tackle these vulnerabilities. The table shows under
which scenarios these proposals were considered to be feasible.
Generally, Industrious Ants offers the most favourable conditions
for decision-making while Sleeping Lions is the most restrictive,
but both scenarios have a mix of challenges and opportunities. This
mix is especially pronounced in the Lone Leopards and Herd of
Zebra scenarios, where on the one hand certain types of policy
appear favourable but on the other hand gains can be made by
going against the regional gain.
The proposals emerging from the normative back-casting
received statements of support from diverse non-state organiza-
tions, the different ministries and regional bodies. There was also
an identiﬁed role for the Climate Change, Agriculture and Food
Security programme to provide science and for convening actors in
a number of the proposed actions. In addition, the Forum for
Agricultural Research in Africa and the African Climate Policy
Centre both showed interest in supporting their own organizations
and the government ministries they were working with to develop
the capacity to use scenarios for strategic planning purposes.
4. Applying lessons on suitable scope, guiding decision-making
and developing longer-term capacity
Insights from the East Africa process were used to shape
scenarios processes in the other focus regions where scenarios
processes were conducted (West Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia,
the Andes region, Central America) as well as subsequent stages in
East Africa.
We improved the suitability of explorative regional scenarios
sets as decision contexts for diverse actors, and the usefulness of
scenarios methodology and engagement in general through a
number of steps. The ﬁrst step was to provide a more inclusive
scope for the general regional scenarios sets. The second step was
shifting to a model of demand-driven, active support for ﬂexible
adaptation and reinterpretation of the regional scenarios in order
to use them for regional, national, sub-national and sector-speciﬁc
decision processes. The third step was to focus on longer-term
development of the internal capacity of diverse regional actors to
develop and use scenarios.
4.1. Extending the scope of the regional scenarios
Several changes were made in response to requests from
multiple actors to extend the scope of the sets of explorative
scenarios, making them more useful to a wide range of potential
users.
4.1.1. Extended time line and combination with climate scenarios
In East Africa and West Africa, scenarios were originally
developed up to 2030 following participants’ bounding of the
processes. However, subsequent users of the scenarios in both
regions wanted to use scenarios up to 2050 and see the socio-
economic scenarios directly combined with climate scenarios. With
this time horizon, the combination of socio-economic scenarios and
Table 2
Institutional vulnerabilities identiﬁed by non-state actors and policy advisors in the East Africa back-casting workshops, and summaries of proposals developed to overcome
each of these vulnerabilities. The table shows the feasibility of each proposal in a given scenario, summarizing a possible pathway to enable its implementation.
Vulnerability Collaborative proposal Industrious Ants Herd of Zebra Lone Leopards Sleeping Lions
(1a) The observer’s role
of the East African
Farmer Federation in
East African
Community policy
means that there is not
enough of a direct link
between farmers’
issues and priorities
and decision-making
(1b) Proposal: organize
processes with speciﬁc
regional bodies for the
East Africa Farmers
Federation to have a
more proactive voice in
agricultural and food
security policy
processes
Conditions for
improving this
vulnerability are most
favourable; though
efﬁciency is
challenging and
conditions are expected
to improve only slowly
Regional platforms
exist but little support
is available for
agricultural
development. Guiding
investments is more
challenging and has to
be related to large-scale
commercial agriculture
Conditions at the
national level are
supportive but no
regional platform – East
Africa Farmers
Federation to focus on
supporting national-
level farmers’ voices
and coordinate
regionally
The East Africa Farmers
Federation are largely
left to their own
devices and plan
accordingly, working
with select individuals,
bottom-up
communities and
international
organizations instead
(2a) The lack of
knowledge exchange
between ministries
within countries and
between countries at
the regional level in
East Africa
(2b) Proposal:
exchange programmes
on farmer’s schools
associations, linked to
‘‘farms of the future’’
programme; on
indigenous, alternative
crops; rural–urban
agriculture
Regional conditions are
supportive of
knowledge exchange,
but developments are
slow and this
programme should be
at the forefront to turn
regional integration on
paper into a reality
Much effort needed to
make regional policy
makers see need for
such a programme,
which is not a priority.
Therefore, the need for
regional integration is
more urgent. Start with
small example case
studies
Exchange at a national
level is stimulated.
Regional exchange is
blocked – though this
proposal can be used to
break down regional
barriers
In Sleeping Lions this
proposal has to rely on
working with
unorthodox networks
of individuals and on
incremental
development
(3a) The lack of
effective collaboration
between civil society,
social entrepreneurs
and governments on
agriculture and food
security
(3b) Proposal: a series
of meeting to explore
state/non-state
partnerships and
compatibilities for
climate adaptation is to
be organized, as well as
training to build the
capacity for
collaboration
Funding opportunities
and institutional
arrangements are
available. Faster action
requires those looking
to make connections to
set the example
Aim to ﬁnd ways to
make use of
mechanisms for state/
non-state collaboration
that exist primarily for
big business
Non-state actors can
link with governments
at the national level;
make connections
across borders that are
difﬁcult for
governments in this
scenario
Actors who seek active
improvement of rural
conditions have work
with civil society. Civil
society organizations
must help get
exceptional individuals
into ofﬁces
(4a) Vulnerability: a
lack of links between
Early Warning Systems
for food security at the
regional level, and a
lack of a connection to
any regional food
reserve
(4b) Proposal: linking
existing Early Warning
Systems for food
security to regional
food reserve planning
Regional food reserve
planning coupled with
Early Warning Systems
will easily be accepted
in this East Africa,
though
implementation will be
slow
This scenario relies
strongly on imports. It
will be a challenge to
get such an idea
funded, and it may end
up on paper only unless
the need for Early
Warning Systems is
framed correctly to get
private sector support
National food reserves
are easily strengthened
and linked to Early
Warning Systems.
Regional coordination
of resources will be a
political challenge
Any development of
regional reserves and
Early Warning Systems
will be under stress
from political
instability and
corruption. Support
from outside the
region, at the global
level, may be key
(5a) Vulnerability: A
lack of institutional
transparency and
problems of corruption
(5b) Proposal: help
progress towards
regional ombudsperson
for the East African
Community
collaboration with the
East African Business
Council; council of
ministers and regional
ombudsman
This proposal is
feasible, but the
challenge will be to
make it effective and to
avoid it from being
undermined as time
goes on
It would prove
challenging though not
impossible to establish
this council, though
few resources will be
available and the
framing should be
focused on large
economic development
There will be almost no
institutional structures
to build on. At a
national level, it will be
easier to ensure
transparency of
governance which can
then be developed
further to the regional
level
Establishing a
governing body against
corruption would be
most needed and least
likely to be successful.
Setting up small topical
commissions within
ministries was
proposed which can set
a good example,
supported from the
bottom up and global
level
(6a) Vulnerability:
climate information
systems are not
effective, and not
integrated with other
sources of information,
with consequences
across scenarios
(6b) Proposal: create
multi-sector climate
information for
meteorological
services, agriculture
sector ministries, the
Climate Prediction and
Application Centre,
African Union and the
Economic Commission
for Africa
The actors involved in
this proposal could
utilize the beginnings
of improved regional
collaboration and be
ahead of the change to
provide an example to
speed up integration
around climate
information systems
Actors involved in this
proposal can try to ﬁnd
large-scale commercial
uses of climate
information and ﬁnd
investment there in a
social entrepreneurism
approach that also
beneﬁts vulnerable
rural communities
National-to-local
organization of climate
information is feasible.
Large-scale investment
in regional
coordination is not, but
information networks
can still be established
Absence of available
investment at a
national/regional level;
funding from outside
the region combined
with bottom-up efforts
by farmers’
organizations might be
the only way to enable
provision of climate
information
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Table 3
Uncertain scenario factors outlined for South Asia resulting in scenarios (scenario names tentative). Here, a combination of 6 factors was used instead of 2 to provide a broader
framing of the scenarios with a view to adaptability.
Tentative scenario
name
Knowledge, education,
information (human
capital)
Governance and
institutions
Science, technology
and innovation
Political stability
and conﬂict
Economic structure Demography
Union of South Asia Aware, informed, educated
population
High institutional
capacity and high
coordination across
agencies
High transfer and
availability of science
and technology
Political stability in
the region
Agricultural sector
is not dominant
Low population
growth and medium
urbanization
Jugad Unaware, uninformed,
uneducated population
Low institutional
capacity and low
coordination across
agencies
Low transfer and
availability of science
and technology
Political instability
and conﬂict in the
region
Agricultural sector
is dominant
High population
growth and high
urbanization
Unstable ﬂourishing Aware, informed, educated
population
High institutional
capacity and high
coordination across
agencies
High transfer and
availability of science
and technology
Political instability
and conﬂict in the
region
Agricultural sector
is dominant
Low population
growth and medium
urbanization
People Power Aware, informed, educated
population
Low institutional
capacity and low
coordination across
agencies
High transfer and
availability of science
and technology
Political instability
and conﬂict in the
region
Agricultural sector
is not dominant
Low population
growth and medium
urbanization
Precipice Aware, informed, educated
population
Low institutional
capacity and low
coordination across
agencies
Low transfer and
availability of science
and technology
Political instability
and conﬂict in the
region
Agricultural sector
is dominant;
informal urban
economies
Medium population
growth and medium
urbanization
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Though climate variability is relevant before 2030, it is only after
2030 that climate scenarios start to diverge in longer-term trends
that signiﬁcantly impact agriculture and food security as repre-
sented by IMPACT and GLOBIOM. Therefore, 2050 became the time
horizon for scenarios in all regions. The scope of quantiﬁcation has
been expanded because of the activities of new process co-
organizers that are interested in and capable of extending that
scope. This includes land use change modelling (Schaldach et al.,
2011), risk simulations (Anto´n et al., 2013), household modelling
(van Wijk et al., 2012) and a model that simulates shocks on food
prices and livelihoods (WFP, 2011).
4.1.2. From a two-axes approach to outlining the scenarios through
multiple factors
The use of the two-axes approach was seen by a minority of
users as having a restrictive scope and an overemphasis on some
factors over others, based on observations during the back-casting
workshops. For this reason, an alternative approach was used in
South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Andes region and Central America
that generated diverse sets of scenarios based on four to six factors
instead of two (Bourgeois et al., 2012). Table 3 shows the factors
used to generate ﬁve scenarios for South Asia. Both methods still go
on to outline a wider range of factors for each scenario. We have
found that that the prominence of more factors in the scenario
deﬁnition, besides providing more basic structure to the develop-
ment of the scenarios, has been perceived by many participants to
generate an inclusive and adaptable scenarios sets, while the two-
axes approach could communicate the differences between the
scenarios more directly.
4.1.3. Linking all sets of regional scenarios to a single set of global
scenarios
Finally, the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways, global explor-
ative socio-economic scenarios generated by the global environ-
mental change community related to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (Kriegler et al., 2012; Moss et al.,
2010) were used to guide the quantiﬁcation of the scenarios in
all regions. First, the regional stakeholders provided the basic
logic of the regional scenarios. Drivers for the IMPACT andGLOBIOM models were chosen by comparing driver inputs from
the regional scenarios with those used in the global Shared
Socio-economic Pathways for each region. This helped deter-
mine where the regional scenarios were similar and where they
differed from the assumptions of the global scenarios, and why.
The link to global-level scenarios makes the regional scenarios
comparable to other case studies, including scenarios processes
in the same programme generated in other regions. This allows
for a global, multi-region analysis of the scenario sets
generated by stakeholders in different regions. Furthermore,
it allows for the regional scenarios to function as a bridge that
translates between global scenarios and national or local
decision-making.
4.2. Using explorative scenarios to guide diverse adaptive decision
pathways in a demand-driven fashion
Initial results of using the scenarios in East Africa indicated that
there are limits to normative back-casting processes that seek to
include many actors together in a single process for the formation
of new collaborative decision pathways. This approach was shown
to help establish new links between participants that did not work
together previously (Appendix C) and to bring up proposals for
change (Table 2). However, the weakness of using a shared
planning for many stakeholders is that such a shared process
generates new, additional plans and is not necessarily attuned to
existing decision-making processes. Therefore, the likelihood that
the plans resulting from such a process will be implemented is not
high and opportunities may be missed to guide existing planning
processes. Therefore, a more demand-driven approach was
established that focused on more speciﬁc groups of stakeholders
and existing decision-making processes. On-going engagement
was organized in a service style, rather than through a single
intervention. This shift prompted several changes as outlined
below.
4.2.1. Moving quickly from the development of scenarios to using the
scenarios in a diversity of planning processes
The need to improve the ability of the regional scenarios
processes to respond to the existing knowledge needs of focused
Table 4
Processes conducted or proposed by regional stakeholders to guide institutional change, policy and investment in their region. The table includes the collaborative back-
casting described in Section 3.4, but also outlines policy processes with speciﬁc actors at the national level as well as at the regional level.
Examples
East Africa Regional level: state and non-state actor
workshops and implementation of regional
proposals (as described in Section 3.4)
Tanzania: review of food security policies
organized by European Commission-funded
project TransMango on the future of food in
Europe in a global context
United Nations Environment programme World
Conservation and Monitoring Centre to commission
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi policy guidance on trade-offs
and synergies between agricultural development and
conservation
West Africa Economic Community of West African States:
regional investment strategies, capacity
building in futures methodology
Mali: review of National Adaptation Plan of
Action
Ghana: Testing results of adaptation research
programme in the context of scenarios with national
policy stakeholders platform
South Asia Pakistan: Pakistan-based Leadership for
Environment and Development non-proﬁt
organization to convene policy guidance
process on food security under climate
change
Bangladesh: review of National Adaptation
Plan of Action supported by the Asian
Development Bank
India: Backbone Implementation Network (Planning
Commission of Indian Government) policies on food
security under Climate Change facilitated by Yes Bank,
a development bank
Southeast
Asia
Regional level: United Nations Environment
programme World Conservation and
Monitoring Centre to lead policy guidance on
trade-offs and synergies between agricultural
development and conservation
North Viet Nam: United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization to organize process
for policy guidance and investment into
Climate Smart Agriculture proposals
Cambodia: regional scenarios coordinator to lead
revision of National Adaptation Plan of Action
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process. The emphasis in each process was shifted from time spent
on the development and review of explorative scenarios to time
spent on exploring diverse opportunities offered by regional actors
for using, and therefore experimenting with and improving, the
regional scenarios. The East African scenarios process made clear
which steps could be made more efﬁcient or removed, making it
possible to reduce the process of scenarios development for the
programme as it expanded into Southeast Asia, the Andes region
and Central America to a single, condensed workshop. The testing
and revising of the scenarios was envisioned to happen through
using the scenarios in actual planning processes, rather than
through tinkering in an extended development process. This way,
the usefulness and quality of the scenarios could be evaluated and
improved in real situations while encouraging a critical perspec-
tive on the scenarios by users in those case studies. In the single
workshop, regional factors of change were outlined and combined
to produce diverse scenarios, narratives were established, and key
indicators and model inputs quantiﬁed.
In addition to the development of scenarios, a session in this
single-workshop model was organized to ask participants to
identify decision-making processes that could be guided by
adapted versions of these regional scenarios. Participants were
asked to provide very concrete information, including opportu-
nities for the funding of such adaptations and uses of the scenarios
in each case. Across six global regions, 81 such opportunities were
identiﬁed by participants, with 23 taken forward initially. Table 4
shows examples of such cases for the use of the regional
explorative scenarios by speciﬁc stakeholder groups.
4.2.2. Adapting the regional scenarios to the needs of different user
groups
The shift from using scenarios for collective normative back-
casting aimed at potential regional-level policies and interven-
tions, to a more demand-driven process led by decision- makers
has led to proposals developed by stakeholders in the six regions
focusing on national and sub-national policies as well as those
from speciﬁc sectors. This has had implications for the methodol-
ogy used to adapt the regional scenarios across levels and sectors.
In the East African non-state and state-focused back-casting
workshops, the ﬁrst step followed the principle of letting new
users of scenarios adapt these scenarios to enhance their
plausibility and relevance. It also served to create a sense ofownership of the scenarios by these participants, who removed,
replaced or added elements to the scenario narratives. This worked
because the same geographic level was being considered.
When the scope of a group of actors differs more, e.g. when
national and local level decision-makers are brought together, a
more complete translation is necessary. Adapting the scenarios in
such cases was done by ﬁrst outlining a set of relevant indicators
for a speciﬁc scope that is of interest to the actors involved in the
case. For instance, a local-level case study might have speciﬁc
indicators related to the dominant local forms of agriculture, local
infrastructure and local power structures, among others. Then,
participants interpret what each broader regional scenario means
for that speciﬁc set of indicators, specifying directions of change
using a semi-quantitative scale and describing the narrative logic
for the change, the volatility of the indicator, their level of
agreement about the change in this indicator in the scenario, their
self-perceived ability to say something meaningful about the
indicator and what additional expertise and sources should be
used to develop it further. Trials with this approach for East and
West Africa showed that this works as long as the scenarios are
interpreted ﬂexibly and some case-speciﬁc factors that have no
direct link with the broader scenarios are also incorporated (Antle
and Nelson, 2013).
4.2.3. Shifting to an on-going engagement model based on regional
expertise
The move to multiple stakeholder-identiﬁed applications of the
scenarios for decision guidance in existing decision processes
shifts the organization of the process away from an intervention-
based model to a model of continuous engagement (Reid et al.,
2009; Selsky and Parker, 2005). The initial back-casting workshops
in East Africa highlighted that such meetings should be the
beginning of longer-term partnerships to have impact. Workshops
(over several days) are not necessarily the most effective approach
for engaging the highest-level decision-makers who are in the best
position to turn the ideas generated into actions.
The shift to continuous engagement has implications for the
organization of the structure of the scenarios process in terms of
expertise. In the early stages of the East Africa scenarios process, the
engagement with stakeholders was largely driven by method
experts not embedded in regional policy networks. The recognized
need for continuous, day-to-day engagement to ensure effective
partnerships with decision-makers to address real issues has meant
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to regional coordinators who are experts on the regions and linked
into regional networks. This approach, though more resource-
intensive, increases the likelihood that opportunities for the
scenarios to be used in decision-making are taken forward.
4.3. Developing long-term ownership and strategic capacity
The scenarios process to date has continually involved the
researchers who have designed and led the process in each region.
Our lessons in East Africa, however, led to a shift in focus towards
providing demand-driven support to diverse speciﬁc decision-
making processes that various regional actors are involved in. This
has raised questions around the feasibility in terms of resources,
the ownership of such processes, and the longer-term capacity that
they develop. For a scenarios methodology to be a feasible and
sustainable tool for decision-makers in the longer term, the
ownership of such processes, and the capacity to implement them,
should ultimately be increasingly with the home organizations of
the decision-makers themselves.
4.3.1. Creating co-ownership of decision guidance processes
To ensure feasibility and ownership, the organizers of the
scenarios processes presented in this paper have sought to use
their own resources to generate the regional scenarios (so that the
basic decision-making tool is available), with possible contribu-
tions from partners, and then let national entities (such as the
Leadership for Environment and Development non-proﬁt organi-
zation in Pakistan), regional bodies (such as the Economic
Community of West African States) and global institutions (such
as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization) take the
lead on various opportunities for decision guidance (Table 4).
Several elements important to help establish this co-ownership
have been recognized. The degree to which those involved in
organizing the process are involved in relevant networks
determines how many opportunities for co-ownership of scenarios
processes are recognized and pursued. The addition of regional
coordinating experts to the team organizing the scenarios
processes is an example of this. Additionally, the degree to which
partners’ objectives and ideas about best practice are similar to the
organizers of the scenarios programme has proven a relevant
factor for collaboration. Those partners co-owning the scenarios
processes have stated that the combination of stakeholder-driven
explorative scenarios and quantitative exploration of those
scenarios combined with the use of these scenarios focused on
normative (policy, investment, institutional) objectives is what
interests them. Related to this point is the early involvement of
potential partners in scenarios development to generate co-
ownership of the content. Finally, publicity and media generated
interest in the methods and results from potential partners.
4.3.2. Developing internal capacity in decision-makers’ organizations
To ensure a longer-term strategic capacity among decision-
makers to develop adaptive decision pathways, there is a need to
develop internal familiarity with scenarios methodology within
their organizations. Following the processes described in this
paper, many local, national and regional actors have requested aid
with developing such internal expertise further. Of particular note
is the request by a number of farmers’ organizations worldwide for
help in developing internal expertise on scenarios methodology to
help strategize and dialogue with other actors about farmers’
futures. The teams involved in the scenarios processes outlined in
this paper, together with the Global Forum on Agricultural
Research’ Global Foresight Hub, have provided time to help
develop this internal capacity with farmers’ organizations through
trainings and methodological backstopping.5. Discussion and conclusions
The development and use of explorative scenarios is not about
the capacity to provide solutions to known problems but rather the
development of capacity to produce and structure anticipatory
knowledge (Wilkinson, 2009). Decision processes that do not take
the uncertainty associated with contextual changes into account
miss a context against which to explore adaptive decision
pathways (Kok et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2011). This includes
processes that use normative back-casting exclusively without
applying that method in the context of multiple scenarios.
Conversely, processes that only develop explorative scenarios
but do not actively use them may not be able to guide decision
pathways. Rather than using one method, the combination of
explorative scenarios and normative back-casting aims to use the
strengths of multiple methods in a complementary fashion (Flood
and Jackson, 1991). However, it is important to recognize that the
approach presented here is only one of many potential ways to
integrate explorative and normative elements into planning (Flood
and Jackson, 1991). The Agrimonde (Paillard et al., 2011) scenarios
use an alternative approach – these two scenarios are normative.
From the perspective of adaptation, they integrate context and
actor actions, which in our view make them less useful for active
planning. However, they offer fundamentally different internal
logics based on different worldviews and discourses, which means
that each scenario has a fundamentally different scope.
This case study has generated clues on how to ensure
appropriate scope, move to continuous engagement and ensure
the future longevity of scenarios work in multi-actor, multi-level
contexts. However, our challenges have far from disappeared.
In terms of providing an adequate scope, though the explorative
scenarios used in East Africa are adaptable and include multiple
dimensions of food systems, they still emphasize the production
dimension, especially the quantitative elements with regard to the
largely production-oriented models (Bourgeois et al., 2012).
Broadening their qualitative and quantitative scope requires
new types of expertise and methods. Similarly, the challenge to
make the assumptions of simulation models more ﬂexible and less
past-oriented remains. For example, iterative learning between
models and stakeholder-generated content can be taken further to
propose changes to model structures and scope. There is a
challenge of informing higher-level explorative scenarios through
bottom-up processes. For the process described in this paper, this
challenge works both ways. Local-to-national level processes can
inform the regional scenarios. The regional scenarios can in turn
inform global scenarios to conduct a global-level analysis of
contextual challenges and opportunities for food security across
the developing world, based in the perspectives of regional actors
(Kriegler et al., 2012).
In terms of enabling adaptation pathways, the focus on
collaborative proposals used in East Africa assumes that such
collaboration is desired or possible between different actors, but in
many cases it may not be (Flood and Jackson, 1991). So far, the
engagement of state actors and non-state actors in normative
back-casting processes has provided the ﬁrst steps for these
different groups to overcome the unwillingness they initially
reported about working together and consider collaborative
action. However, the explorative scenarios have not yet been
used to foster collaboration between actors that are diametrically
opposed or antagonistic, though scenarios methodology has been
used for conﬂict resolution (Kahane, 2010). After the initial East
Africa experiences with normative back-casting in multi-stake-
holder platforms, the shift of focus to the policies of speciﬁc
organizations and government places less emphasis on collabora-
tion between multiple actors and more on a diversity of efforts
(Ostrom, 2010). If feasible, we would encourage that both types of
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national adaptation plans) provides ‘‘lower hanging fruits’’ and can
offer successful case studies. On the basis of these examples, new
decision pathways with less precedence and involving new
combinations of stakeholders (such as a constellation of ministries,
the media and regional research organizations) can be developed
and potentially be used to resolve conﬂict.
In terms of developing internal capacity for strategic planning
beyond the lifetime of the project, the research presented in this
paper has worked from the assumption that it is important to
stimulate stakeholders to take ownership of the process. This
could overcome the divide between scenario developers and users
observed in other attempts to generate useful food security
scenarios (Reilly and Willenbockel, 2010). However, explorative
scenarios and normative back-casting methods have a steep
learning curve (Schoemaker, 1993) and more effort is needed to
help develop decision-makers’ facility with such methods to the
point where they become part of daily decision-making practice
where up to now more linear planning models dominate.
Decision-makers in all regions described in this paper have
emphasized this need. New tools for training, education and
experimentation are therefore needed to enable familiarity with
the development of explorative scenarios and their use in decision
guidance through back-casting and other methods. That way,
research organizations can shift from driving scenarios processes,
to process facilitators, to a position where they are mainly
providing methodology and science support to internal experts in
decision-makers’ organizations and platforms. A key solution
could be offered by online learning tools that formalize scenarios
methodology in an accessible way (Vervoort et al., 2010),
especially if they can be based in social learning principles
(Kristjanson et al., 2014).
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